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GOD, JESUS, ALLAH AND YAHWEH SHOULD BE GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES: HOW ZELMAN v. SIMMONS-HARRIS CAN
ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF
FAITH-BASED SERVICES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Preamble of the U.S. Constitution identifies "promote the gen-
eral Welfare" as one of the reasons for the establishment of the Constitu-
tion. 1 Thus, the U.S. government, within the limits established by the
Constitution, should use its power and best efforts to ensure the health
and prosperity of Americans. The government's goal, however, should go
beyond good intentions and achieve good, compassionate results. 2
Whether it was the programs of the New Deal that helped the downtrod-
den out of the Great Depression or the programs of the War on Poverty
started in the 1960s, these governmental acts had great intentions and
great results for their time period.3 Many of these programs still remain,
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Lib-
erty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.").
2. See Foreword by President George W. Bush, at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/reports/faithbased.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) ("The paramount
goal must be compassionate results, not compassionate intentions. Federal policy
should reject the failed formula of towering, distant bureaucracies that too often
prize process over performance. We must be outcome-based, insisting on success
and steering resources to the effective and to the inspired.").
3. See ALAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, A POCKET HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 417-22 (9th ed. 1992) (summarizing Roosevelt's presidency and
New Deal). President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal encompassed legislation and
programs that both helped the country get out of the Great Depression and re-
formed the government to protect the country's welfare in the future. See id.
(describing effects of New Deal legislation). President Lyndon B. Johnson de-
clared the War on Poverty in his 1964 State of the Union address. See Fred Green-
baum, War on Poverty, in GROLIER MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://gi.grolier.
com/presidents/aae/side/waronp.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (explaining
historical background of War on Poverty). New programs such as VISTA (Volun-
teers in Service to America), Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, College Work
Study, Head Start and Community Action Program were created. See id. (stating
service programs). The Office of Economic Opportunity, run by Sargent Shriver,
had full authority over these programs; however, due to funding of the Vietnam
War, the Office of Economic Opportunity received inadequate funding. See id.
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as do the good intentions behind them, but an ever-growing cynicism
about their productivity has surfaced. 4
To achieve better results, the government has slowly reached out to
faith-based social services and other community-based services to help revi-
talize the welfare system and the War on Poverty.5 The Welfare Reform
Act of 1996 includes the Charitable Choice language, assuring religious
social services that they can receive government funding without losing
their religious character.6 Nevertheless, according to President Bush and
his administration, burdens and biases still prevent smaller groups, both
faith-based and secular, from receiving federal funding.7 In January 2001,
4. See Martha Minow, Public Values in an Era of Privatization: Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1242 (2003)
(noting perceptions of widespread failure). The welfare system was reformed in
1996 because of these negative perceptions of the government's widespread fail-
ure. See id. (stating that perceptions led to reform). Echoing these same percep-
tions of the government's failure, President Bush stated in his May 2001
commencement address at the University of Notre Dame that:
Lyndon Johnson advocated a War on Poverty that had noble intentions
and some enduring successes. Poor families got basic health care; disad-
vantaged children were given a head start in life. Yet, there were also
some consequences that no one wanted or intended. The welfare entitle-
ment became an enemy .of personal effort and responsibility, turning
many recipients into dependents. The War on Poverty also turned too
many citizens into bystanders, convinced that compassion had become
the work of government alone.
George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Commencement Address University
of Notre Dame, Indiana (May 21, 2001) [hereinafter Notre Dame Commencement
Address], at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/print/200105
21-1.html.
5. For a discussion of the government's faith-based initiatives, see infra notes
63-72 and accompanying text.
6. The Charitable Choice language is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2003).
Subsection (b) states:
The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious
organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates,
vouchers, or other forms of disbursement under any program described
in subsection (a) (2), on the same basis as any other nongovernmental
provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations,
and without diminishing the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assis-
tance funded under such program.
42 U.S.C. § 604a(b). Subsection (d) states that "[a] religious organization with a
contract described in subsection (a) (1) (A), or which accepts certificates, vouchers,
or other forms of disbursement under subsection (a) (1) (B), shall retain its inde-
pendence from Federal, State, and local governments, including such organiza-
tion's control over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its
religious beliefs." Id. § 604a(d).
7. See Press Release, The White House, Unlevel Playing Field: Barriers to Par-
ticipation by Faith-Based and Community Organizations in Federal Social Service
Programs, at Introduction (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/08/unlevelfield.html [hereinafter White House Release] ("A
funding gap exists between the government and the grassroots. Smaller groups,
faith-based and secular, receive very little Federal support relative to the size and
scope of the social services they provide. There exists a widespread bias against
faith- and community-based organizations in Federal social service programs.").
[Vol. 49: p. 661
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President Bush issued Executive Order 13199, creating the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.8 Its goal is to "enlist,
equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of faith-based and other
community organizations to the extent permitted by law."9
Why do President Bush and many others believe that faith-based ser-
vices and other community-based services can achieve better results for
less fortunate Americans than can the federal government? One commen-
tator posited that the current President "sees poverty as a status that can
be overcome through hard work, love, and compassion." According to
this commentator, "religious institutions are better able to address the
problems of the poor than government agencies."10 This Note argues that
the compassion espoused by faith-based services can do a good, if not bet-
ter, job than the lethargic federal bureaucracy in leading the homeless,
the addicted and other similarly situated individuals out of their
conditions."1
While the benefits of faith-based services seem hard to dispute, the
constitutionality of funding these organizations has caused and will con-
tinue to cause heated debate. 12 According to one scholar, "[flew issues
are more divisive in American legal culture than government support of
religion."13 There is great debate on whether these groups should be
funded by the government, but poverty, poor urban schools and other
social ills still plague this country. This Note posits that faith-based ser-
vices, such as soup kitchens or drug rehabilitation centers, provide the
United States a much needed social service aimed at curing these ills.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,14 a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in
2002, provides a constitutional framework for government funding of
8. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (establishing
Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to "coor-
dinate a national effort to expand opportunities for faith-based and other commu-
nity organizations and to strengthen their capacity to better meet social needs in
America's communities").
9. Id.
10. Matthew Diller, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Ac-
tors: Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. Rv. 1739,
1742 (2002).
11. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of faith-based services, see
infra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
12. See David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. Rv. 559, 559 (2002) (explaining how Bush's faith-
based initiatives rekindled debate about government support of religion).
13. Id. Cole describes the divide over the issue of government funding of
religion through school vouchers or through faith-based services as reflective of a
deeper divide in American culture. Our country is split "between those who be-
lieve that religion already plays too dominant a role in public life, and those who
believe that religion has been improperly banished from the public square." Id. at
561.
14. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2004] NOTE
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faith-based services. 15 In Zelman, the Supreme Court concluded that
Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program did not offend the Establish-
ment Clause of the Constitution. 16 The program gives parents of children
in Cleveland public schools, one of the worst performing public school
systems in the nation, the option of receiving a tuition aid voucher for a
participating private religious or secular school. 1 7 The program also pro-
vides tutorial aid for children who remain in the public schools.1 8 The
majority reasoned that the program did not violate the Establishment
Clause for two reasons: (1) the program had a valid secular purpose of
providing educational assistance to poor children in a failing school dis-
trict, and (2) the program did not have the effect of advancing or inhib-
iting a religion because the aid was given to the parents who had a true
private choice in deciding whether to send their children to a religious
school.19 Thus, Zelman symbolizes the concept of true, genuine and inde-
pendent private choice and demonstrates how, when the beneficiary of
government-funded religious entities has this choice, there is no violation
of the Establishment Clause.20
This Note proposes that the Zelman decision reflects the Supreme
Court's trend away from separationism and establishes a possible frame-
work for other government funding of religious institutions, including
15. See Paul Salamanca, Choice and Market-Based Separationism, 50 Burr. L. REv.
931, 931-32 (2002) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris appears to clear the way for a wide variety of educational and charitable
choice plans.... If taken to its logical limits, the rule of law announced in Zelman
appears competent to sustain any of a number of public programs in which the
government joins with private organizations, both secular and non-secular, to pro-
vide secular services.").
16. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-44 (holding that Ohio's school voucher pro-
gram does not offend Establishment Clause).
17. See id. at 645 (stating that any private school, religious or secular, could
participate in program as long as it met certain statewide educational standards).
Public schools in the surrounding towns of Cleveland were also eligible to partici-
pate. See id. (explaining possible public school participation). Nevertheless, none
of the public schools were participating at the time this case was decided. See id. at
647 (noting lack of participation by public schools).
18. See id. at 645-46 (explaining other part of Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship
Program). The tutorial aid portion of the program is not relevant to the Establish-
ment Clause issue at hand. Parents simply arrange for their children to meet with
registered tutors and then submit the bills to the state. See id. at 646 (discussing
procedures for receiving tutorial aid benefit). For the tutorial aid, students from
low-income families receive 90%, up to $360, while all other families receive 75%
of that amount. See id. (explaining how funding is disbursed). The number of
tutorial aid grants in a school district must equal the number of tuition aid scholar-
ships provided in that same district. See id. at 646-47 (stating institutional require-
ment for program).
19. See id. at 648-49 (holding that program's purpose was indisputably secular,
and forbidden effect was not established when individuals freely directed aid to
religious schools or institutions).
20. See id. ("The key to these new relationships, the Court held, is the concept
of 'true,' 'genuine,' and 'independent' private choice to partake of services offered
by religious entities.").
664 [Vol. 49: p. 661
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faith-based services.21 Part III.A. of this Note explains how Zelman repre-
sents the Supreme Court's trend of moving Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence further away from strict separationism. 22 Part III.B. advocates that
where there is a voucher system for social service recipients who have a
true private choice between providers (both religious and secular), gov-
ernment funding of faith-based services is within the constitutional frame-
work of Zelman.23 Part III.B. also demonstrates how direct government
funding of these services can actually be considered indirect aid if vouch-
ers are used.24 Part III.C. analyzes criticism of whether the requirement of
true private choice has actually been satisfied in these types of funding.2 5
Lastly, Part III.D. discusses the effectiveness and the pragmatic benefits of
more intense government funding of faith-based services. 26
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
In 1996, because of Cleveland's failing public schools, Ohio started its
Pilot Project Scholarship Program. 2 7 The program provides tuition aid
for students to attend a participating public or private school of their par-
ents' choosing and also provides tutorial aid for students remaining in the
public schools. 28 Families with incomes two hundred percent below the
poverty line are given priority.29 Eighty-two percent of the participating
21. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917,
919 (2003) ("Zelman represents the most recent and dramatic move away from
Separationism. By holding in no uncertain terms that the Cleveland school
voucher program satisfies constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court has
opened the door for a wide range of relationships, once thought impermissible,
between government and religious institutions.").
22. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
27. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644-45 (2002) (citing OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Anderson 2000)) ("The program provides finan-
cial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been 'under
federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the dis-
trict by the state superintendent.' Cleveland is the only Ohio school district to fall
within that category.").
28. See id. at 645 ("The program provides two basic kinds of assistance to par-
ents of children in a covered district. First, the program provides tuition aid for
students in kindergarten through third grade, expanding each year through
eighth grade, to attend a participating public or private school of their parent's
choosing. Second, the program provides tutorial aid for students who choose to
remain enrolled in public school.") (citations to statutes omitted).
29. See id. at 646 (stating program's priority for families well below poverty
line). The setup of the program is as follows:
Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are
eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. For these
2004] NOTE 665
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schools are religious and, so far, ninety-six 1ercent of the students have
chosen to attend the religious schools. 30 None of the public schools in
the neighboring towns agreed to participate in the school voucher
program. 3 1
The Pilot Project Scholarship Program was actually part of a broader
initiative to improve the educational options for Cleveland school chil-
dren so they can receive a better education. 32 Community schools and
magnet schools were also opened during this time.3 3 A group of Ohio
taxpayers challenged the school voucher program in state court on state
and federal grounds during the same year it was enacted.34 After various
procedural steps, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris found its way to the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
33
lowest-income families, participating private schools may not charge a pa-
rental co-payment greater than $250. For all other families, the program
pays 75% of tuition costs, up to $1,875, with no co-payment cap. These
families receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships
exceeds the number of low-income children who choose to participate.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
30. See id. at 647 ("In the 1999-2000 school year, 56 private schools partici-
pated in the program, 46 (or 82%) of which had a religious affiliation.... More
than 3,700 students participated in the scholarship program, most of whom (96%)
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of these students were from
families at or below the poverty line.").
31. See id. (acknowledging that none of public schools in districts adjacent to
Cleveland elected to participate).
32. See id. (explaining different types of alternative education programs in
Cleveland). Cleveland public schools have been labeled one of the worst perform-
ing public school systems in the country. See id. at 644 (stating deplorable state of
Cleveland public schools). In 1995, when a federal district court put the district
under state control, that court declared the district a "crisis of magnitude." Id.
The situation was so poor that only one out of ten ninth graders could pass a basic
proficiency examination. See id. (showing that only few students could pass profi-
ciency exam). Two-thirds of the high school students dropped out or failed out
prior to graduation, and of those students who made it to their senior year, one
out of every four still failed to graduate. See id. (discussing graduation rate). Fur-
thermore, of those who did graduate, few could read, write or compute at the same
level as high school graduates in other cities. See id. (explaining low levels of profi-
ciency for high school graduates of Cleveland schools).
33. See id. at 647 (stating that Pilot Project Scholarship Program was part of
broader initiative that included community and magnet schools).
34. See id. at 648 (noting opposition to school voucher program). Teachers'
unions and People for the American Way led the voucher opposition. See Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 21, at 921 (describing opposition to voucher program).
35. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648 (detailing procedural posture of case). The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the federal claim, but found a violation of the state
constitution, which led the Ohio legislature to quickly correct the violation to keep
the program alive. See id. ("The Ohio Supreme Court rejected respondents' fed-
eral claims, but held that the enactment of the program violated certain procedu-
ral requirements of the Ohio Constitution. The state legislature immediately
cured this defect, leaving the basic provisions discussed above intact."). Therefore,
in 1999, the voucher opponents filed an action in the U.S. district court seeking to
enjoin the reenacted program as a violation of the Establishment Clause. See id.
(indicating steps taken in federal district court). The district court granted sum-
[Vol. 49: p. 661666
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A majority of the Court decided that Ohio's school voucher program
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program had the
valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to disadvantaged
children and because it did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.36 Specifically, the Court stated, "The Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the 'purpose' or 'ef-
fect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."3
7
While the majority summarily decided that there was no dispute over
the valid secular purpose of Ohio's program, it did thoroughly explain
why the program did not have the forbidden effect of advancing or inhib-
iting religion. 38 In answering the "effect" question, the Supreme Court
first considered whether this program was direct aid or indirect aid involv-
ing genuine and independent choice made by private individuals. 39 In
contrast to programs that provide direct aid to religious schools, this pro-
gram was one of "true private choice, in which government aid reache [d]
religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices
of private individuals." 40 In Mueller v. Allen,4 1 Witters v. Washington Depart-
ment of Services for the Blind4 2 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,43
the Court addressed Establishment Clause challenges to neutral govern-
ment programs that provided aid to individuals who then directed it to
religious schools as a result of their own independent, private choice. 4 4 In
each of these cases, the Court rejected the Establishment Clause
challenge. 45
Relying on these cases, the Court likewise rejected the Establishment
Clause challenge in Zelman.4 6 The majority concluded that Ohio's pro-
gram embodied the principle of true private choice and thus mirrored the
maryjudgment for the Ohio taxpayers and the court of appeals affirmed that deci-
sion. See id. (overviewing procedure in lower courts). The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the court of appeals. See id.
(describing procedural steps leading to Supreme Court).
36. See id. at 648-49 (holding that there is no violation of Establishment
Clause).
37. Id.
38. See id. at 649 ("There is no dispute that the program challenged here was
enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor
children in a demonstrably failing public school system.").
39. See id. (stating that answer depends on distinction between direct aid and
indirect aid).
40. Id.
41. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
42. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
43. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
44. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-52 (describing analysis used in these three
cases to reject similar Establishment Clause challenges).
45. See id. at 649 ("Three times we have rejected such challenges.").
46. See id. at 652 (stating that Mueller, Witters and Zobrest establish basis for no
violation of Establishment Clause in Zelman).
2004] NOTE
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constitutional framework of the programs in Mueller, Witters and Zobrest.4 7
First, the program permitted all private schools, both religious and secu-
lar, within the school district to participate and also permitted adjacent
public schools to participate without giving any type of preference or in-
centive to one type of school.48 Second, the ability of the parents to make
a true private choice was not diminished by the fact that most of the partic-
ipating schools were religious schools. 4 9 Choice must be analyzed by eval-
uating all options to Cleveland school children; therefore, the school
voucher was just one program in addition to the magnet school or com-
munity school option. 50 Lastly, Justice Rehnquist wrote that private choice
of individuals is a critical factor for determining the constitutionality of
government-funding programs:
[T] he constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program sim-
ply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a
particular time, most private schools are run by religious organi-
47. See id. at 653 ("We believe that the program challenged here is a program
of true private choice, consistent with Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and thus
constitutional.").
48. See id. (indicating that all schools within district, along with adjacent pub-
lic schools, can participate). There is no preference to which private schools
within the district may participate. The only preference in the program is toward
giving the aid to low-income families. See id. (noting only low-income families re-
ceive preference). There are no financial incentives to skew the program to relig-
ious schools, but rather there are disincentives for them because private schools
only receive one-half the government assistance given to community schools, one-
third the assistance given to magnet schools and adjacent public schools (if they
decided to participate) are eligible to receive two to three times the state funding
of a private school. See id. at 653-54 ("The program here in fact creates financial
disincentives for religious schools . . . ."). In addition, parents would not have to
pay anything if they sent their children to a magnet or community school, but
would have to pay the difference of the private school's tuition. See id. at 654 (dis-
cussing costs to parents for choosing to send children to religious private school
through program and lack of costs for sending children to community or magnet
school). This may dissuade some parents, who want some type of alternative to the
public schools, from choosing the private school option. See id. ("Families too have
a financial disincentive to choose a private religious school over other schools.").
49. See id. at 658 (stating that constitutionality of neutral aid program does
not simply turn on whether and why most private schools are run by religious
organizations or most recipients choose to use voucher at religious school).
50. See id. at 655-56 ("The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is
coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools, and that question
must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland school chil-
dren, only one of which is to obtain a program scholarship and then choose a
religious school."). Justice O'Connor emphasizes this rationale in her concur-
rence by stating that while 82% of the participating schools are religious and 96%
of the participating students are in religious schools, when you add in the students
who attend community schools, the percentage of students in religious schools
falls to 62.1%. See id. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining how per-
centages change when community school option is included). Moreover, when
you add the percentage of students in magnet schools to that number, the percent-
age of students in religious schools falls to 16.5%. See id. (explaining how percent-
age of religious schools drops when all options are considered).
[Vol. 49: p. 661
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zations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
school. As we said in Mueller, "such an approach would scarcely
provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we
perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence
might be evaluated."
51
Thus, Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program is constitutional and
stands as a framework for government programs that involve funding of
religious organizations where true private choice is in the hands of the
program's beneficiaries.
B. Government Funding of Religion
Government funding of religious entities is neither particular to relig-
ious schools nor a recent or occasional phenomenon. 5 2 As one commen-
tator stated, "[t]he reality is that the divide between the public and private
sectors has never been a clean line."53 Religiously affiliated hospitals and
child welfare and social services have received government funding for
decades through entitlement programs structured as insurance or vouch-
ers.54 These religious institutions usually operate as nonprofit organiza-
51. Id. at 658. Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to explain how the numbers
have fluctuated from year to year. For the school year 1999-2000, 96% of the schol-
arship recipients attended religious schools; however, in the 1997-1998 school
year, only 78% of them attended religious schools. See id. at 659 (showing disparity
between percentages for two different school years). This drastic increase is due to
the fact that two private nonreligious schools participating in the program that had
enrolled 15% of the recipients decided to register as community schools for the
1999-2000 school year. See id. (explaining why increase occurred). Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that since "[m ] any of the students enrolled in these schools
as scholarship students remained enrolled as community school students," it would
be considered arbitrary to count "one type of school but not the other to assess
primary effect." Id. at 659-60. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to include all
alternative educational choices in Cleveland when analyzing the issue of true pri-
vate choice.
52. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1239 ("Nor is it new to see religious organiza-
tions in the business of schooling and social welfare.").
53. Diller, supra note 10, at 1743.
54. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1239 (explaining that this phenomenon was
due to social conventions and constitutional interpretations). Justice O'Connor in
her concurrence remarks that religious hospitals account for 18% of all hospital
beds nationwide and rely on Medicare funds for 36% of their revenue. See Zelman,
536 U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing government funding of
health services provided by religious entities). It is worth noting that religion has
long played a part in the administration of health services from the early days of
alms houses to current drug and alcohol treatment programs like Alcoholics Anon-
ymous. SeeJudith B. Goodman, Note and Comment, Charitable Choice: The Ramifica-
tions of Government Funding for Faith-Based Health Care Services, 26 NOVA L. REv. 563,
586 (2002) (describing religion's role in health services).
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tions separate from their religion's place of worship, thus observers may
not even realize the religious connection. 55
In Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman, she mentioned a
lengthy list of government benefits going to religious organizations. 56 She
stated that "[a]gainst this background, the support that the Cleveland
voucher program provides religious institutions is neither substantial nor
atypical of existing government programs."5 7 Her list focused on tax poli-
cies and funding through public health, social service and educational
programs.58 With respect to tax policies, religious organizations may qual-
ify for exemptions from federal and state corporate income tax and prop-
erty tax in all fifty states.
59
In addition, clergy may qualify for federal tax breaks on income used
for housing, and lay individuals, corporations, trusts and estates may re-
ceive a tax deduction for charitable contributions to religious groups.60
Thus, these tax policies definitely confer a benefit on religious organiza-
tions.6 1 As to other government funding, religious institutions receive aid
through public health programs like Medicare and Medicaid, through ed-
ucational programs like Pell Grants and the GI Bill and through childcare
programs such as the Child Care and Development Block Grant Pro-
55. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1239 (explaining that observers do not realize
religious affiliation of many nonprofit agencies, but staff and volunteers are often
acting out of religious conviction).
56. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 665-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing various
government funding provided to religious institutions). These benefits include
exemptions from federal corporate income tax and tax deductions for charitable
contributions to qualified religious groups, to name a few. See id. (delineating ex-
amples of government benefits).
57. Id. at 668. Justice O'Connor, however, qualifies this statement by saying
that this alone does not justify the school voucher program under the Establish-
ment Clause, but rather places the "alarmist claims" against the program in a
broader perspective. Id.
58. For a further discussion of government benefits that go to religious orga-
nizations, see infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
59. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing state
and federal tax exemptions for religious organizations).
60. See id. (explaining other tax considerations for religion). Note that tax
deductions for charitable contributions reduce the federal tax revenue by $25 bil-
lion annually and over 60% of household charitable contributions go to religious
charities. See id. at 666 (stating effect of tax deductions on tax revenue and preva-
lence of these deductions).
61. See id. at 665-66 (stating that tax policies confer significant benefit on re-
ligious institutions). Justice O'Connor supports her statement by showing that:
The state property tax exemptions for religious institutions alone amount
to very large sums annually. For example, available data suggests that
Colorado's exemption lowers that State's tax revenues by more than $40
million annually; Maryland's exemption lowers revenues by more than
$60 million; Wisconsin's exemption lowers revenues by approximately
$122 million; and Louisiana's exemption, looking just at the city of New
Orleans, lowers revenues by over $36 million.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
670 [Vol. 49: p. 661
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gram. 62 This list portrays the extensive connection between government
support of religious organizations and religious organizations' value to our
country.
C. Charitable Choice and Bush's Faith-Based Service Initiatives
The Charitable Choice concept of welfare reform paves the way for
the Bush Administration's faith-based service initiatives.63 According to
the White House, Charitable Choice's purpose is "to remedy overly restric-
tive rules and confusion about the constitutional requirements for Govern-
ment collaboration with faith-based providers."64  This purpose is
achieved through a statutory vehicle-42 U.S.C. § 604a:
The purpose of this section [604a] is to allow states to contract
with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to
accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement...
on the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider with-
out impairing the religious character of such organizations, and
without diminishing the religious freedom of beneficiaries of as-
sistance funded .... 65
Faith-based social service providers have always provided these services to
our society, and because of Charitable Choice, these organizations can
now benefit from the government's desires to privatize and to find a better
way to care for people. 66
62. See id. at 666-67 (exemplifying more types of government funding of relig-
ious entities). Justice O'Connor emphasizes that all of "[t]hese programs are well-
established parts of our social welfare system." Id. at 667.
63. See Bruce Murray, Mixing Government and Religion, at http://
www.facsnet.org/issues/faith/nathan.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2003) ("Former
President Bill Clinton coined the phrase, 'ending welfare as we know it,' which has
a subtext based in morals and values; and Clinton signed into law Charitable
Choice legislation, which paved the way for President Bush's Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives.").
64. White House Release, supra note 7, at Barriers to Faith-Based Organiza-
tions Seeking Federal Support. To accomplish this purpose, "Charitable Choice
attacks the anti-religious bias that pervades too many statutes, regulations, and
practices, ensures that groups use Government funds for public purposes, and pro-
vides a clear set of guidelines to discipline and structure these needed collabora-
tions." Id. at 17.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2003).
66. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1240 (noting benefits of privatization). Minow
explains that:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the increasing use of private orga-
nizations to achieve public ends reflects a number of trends: disillusion-
ment with government programs, faith in competition and consumer
choice, politicians' desire to claim to have diminished government when
in fact they have merely outsourced it, and strategic pressure for privatiza-
tion by lobbying groups. Religious providers continue educational or so-
cial-service activities they started years before but now benefit from the
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President Bush's faith-based service initiatives were enacted to ensure
that the Charitable Choice legislation is actually used and actually pro-
duces benefits for faith-based services and for the people they help.6 7 The
Bush Administration found that (1) faith-based and community services
receive little federal financial support compared to the size and scope of
the good they provide, (2) they experience widespread bias and burden-
some regulations and (3) federal administrators have done little to help or
require states and local governments to be more receptive to the new rules
for faith-based services.6 8 In response, Bush established a White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to help bolster the ability
of the government to fund faith-based and community services.
69
The Bush Administration's belief that faith-based and community ser-
vices are an appropriate way for the government to promote our general
welfare is based on the principle that "private administration of social pro-
grams is inherently superior to government administration." 70 The rheto-
ric, however, is not a reflection of privatization as a better management
theory; rather, the rhetoric invokes the language of the War on Poverty. 7
1
Bush's belief in the power of faith and compassion is the driving force
behind his attempt at reviving the failing War on Poverty through his faith-
based service initiatives.
72
Id.; see also Murray, supra note 63 (quoting Richard Nathan). Nathan stated that
"[t]he idea is that government bureaucracies can't care for people the way faith-
based groups can." Id. Nathan is the director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Insti-
tute of Government and director of The Roundtable on Religion and Social Wel-
fare Policy. See id. (identifying Nathan's experience with politics and religion).
67. See Bush, supra note 2 (stating need to utilize Charitable Choice legisla-
tion to make federal programs more friendly to faith-based services).
68. See White House Release, supra note 7, at Introduction (listing findings of
report by Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
69. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (establish-
ing Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
70. Diller, supra note 10, at 1757 (noting principle underlying privatization of
social programs).
71. See id. at 1757-58 (explaining that Bush does not present faith-based ser-
vice initiatives as simply better management theory). "[Bush's] rhetoric draws
heavily on the language of community empowerment development by supporters
of the War on Poverty." Id. at 1758. An example of this War on Poverty rhetoric
was in President Bush's remarks at the 2001 University of Notre Dame commence-
ment address:
When poverty is considered hopeless, America is condemned to perma-
nent social division, becoming a nation of caste and class, divided by
fences and gates and guards. Our task is clear, and it's difficult: we must
build our country's unity by extending our country's blessings. We make
that commitment because we are Americans. Aspiration is the essence of
our country. We believe in social mobility, not social Darwinism. We are
the country of the second chance, where failure is never final. And that
dream has sometimes been deferred. It must never be abandoned.
Notre Dame Commencement Address, supra note 4.
72. See Diller, supra note 10, at 1761 ("The president's goal is to uplift individ-
ual people 'who hurt' through love and compassion. For him, the power of faith is
a means of achieving this uplift."). Bush's belief in the power of faith and compas-
[Vol. 49: p. 661
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A. Two Schools of Thought About the Establishment Clause
Any intersection between religion and government rallies two oppos-
ing Establishment Clause schools of thought to the controversy. On one
side of the issue are separationists, who are suspicious of any government
aid to religion, and on the other side are the assimilationists, who argue
that religious organizations should have the same access to government
funding as secular organizations. 73 The separationists view any govern-
ment subsidy of religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause, while
the assimilationists view all aid to religious activity as constitutional, so
long as there is a secular purpose and both religious and secular recipients
are treated equally.7 4 This ideological divide goes beyond interpretations
of the Constitution and "reflects a deeper divide in American culture, be-
tween those who believe that religion already plays too dominant a role in
sion to "uplift" is shown through his words at the 2001 University of Notre Dame
commencement:
We are committed to compassion for practical reasons. When men and
women are lost to themselves, they are also lost to our nation. When
millions are hopeless, all of us are diminished by the loss of their gifts.
And we're committed to compassion for moral reasons. Jewish prophets
and Catholic teaching both speak of God's special concern for the poor.
This is perhaps the most radical teaching of faith-that the value of life is
not contingent on wealth or strength or skill. That value is a reflection of
God's image. Much of today's poverty has more to do with troubled lives
than a troubled economy. And often when a life is broken, it can only be
restored by another caring, concerned human being. The answer for an
abandoned child is not ajob requirement-it is the loving presence of a
mentor. The answer to addiction is not a demand for self-sufficiency-it
is personal support on the hard road to recovery.
Notre Dame Commencement Address, supra note 4.
73. See Cole, supra note 12, at 559 (defining sharp divide between separation-
ists and assimilationists).
74. See id. at 561 (describing divide over role of religion in American culture).
"To separationists, virtually any state subsidy of religious activity offends the Estab-
lishment Clause. To assimilationists, virtually all aid to religious activity is permissi-
ble, so long as the funding serves a secular purpose and is distributed pursuant to
criteria that treat religious and secular recipients equally." Id. Underlying these
contrasting theories is the separationist belief that religion should be treated dis-
tinctively and the opposing belief of neutrality in which religion is no different
from other theories, philosophies or motivations. See Steven K. Green, Of
(Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and
Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1111, 1126 (2002) (stating underlying theories of
separationism and underlying theories in favor of neutrality). The cultural divide,
in John J. Dilulio's terms, is between the "orthodox secularists" and "orthodox
sectarians." John J. Dilulio, Jr., Compassion in Truth and Action: What Washington
Can Not Do to Help, in SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURu'OSES 284 (E.J. DionneJr. & Ming
Hsu Chen eds., 2001) (describing cultural divide). The orthodox secularists, usu-
ally on the political left, pay lip service to the actual good done by faith-based
services while insisting that the government only support programs that are nomi-
nally religious or entirely secular, while the orthodox sectarians want faith-based
services to expressly serve religious purposes. See id. at 284-85 (describing po-
larized views of these two groups).
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public life, and those who believe that religion has been improperly ban-
ished from the public square."
75
In Zelman, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the collision of separationist
and assimilationist viewpoints due to their presence in our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 76 Not only is the legal and cultural divide on gov-
75. Cole, supra note 12, at 561 (describing divide in American culture). Cole
continues to describe this divide: "Like so many difficult public policy issues, this
issue tends to polarize the public, legal scholars, and judges." Id.
76. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 922 (stating that intersection between
these two distinct lines ofjurisprudence might be called "collision"). Prior to the
1940s, there were few Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the Establishment
Clause. See IRA LuPu & ROBERT TUTTLE, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH FAITH-
BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS 16 (2002) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS],
available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/12-4-
2002_state of theLaw.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2003). In 1947, the Supreme Court
began its involvement in policing the boundaries for government funding of relig-
ious institutions. See id. (describing increasing Supreme Court involvement in de-
ciding religious institution cases). In that year, the Court upheld a reimbursement
program for families to pay the cost of public transportation to both public and
private schools. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that
reimbursement program that paid for transportation by public carrier to benefit
children of public and private schools was not unconstitutional). Nevertheless, the
Court announced a strong separationist philosophy. See id. at 16 (stating that while
states cannot contribute tax-raised funds to support institutions that teach particu-
lar faith, states are permitted to extend state law benefits to all citizens regardless
of their religious beliefs). The decision was five to four with the four dissenters
taking an even stronger separationist approach. See id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting) ("[The purpose of the Establishment Clause] was to create a complete
and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."); see
also GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra, at 16 (indicating dissent's use of stronger
separationist principles). Because the principal beneficiaries of the program in-
volved in Everson were Catholic schools, some scholars argue that anti-Catholic sen-
timent caused much of the separationist approach. See id. at 16-17 (questioning
whether anti-Catholic bias is root of separationist approach in Everson). This sepa-
rationist theme carried on for the next thirty years. See id. at 17 (stating continua-
tion of separationism for thirty years after Everson). In the 1970s, separationism
reached its "height of influence." See Salamanca, supra note 15, at 968 (describing
history of separationism in Establishment Clause jurisprudence). In 1971, the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman developed the contemporary test for determining
whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause. See 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971) (considering criteria developed by past precedent to develop three-
part test); see also Alexis Peters, Note and Comment, The Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives: Why the Establishment Clause Prevents Religious and Public Social
Service Providers from Competing on a "Level Playing Field", 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 1173,
1181 (2002) ("Lemon is eminent for providing the contemporary test for whether a
governmental action violates the Establishment Clause."). The Lemon Test has
three prongs: (1) the governmental action must have a secular purpose; (2) the
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the action "must
'not foster' an excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). This test "me-
morialized the separationist standard." Green, supra note 74, at 1120. Beginning
in the early 1980s, the separationism school of thought started to recede and was
trumped by principles of neutrality. See GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra, at 19
(discussing change in this area of constitutional law). Neutrality essentially be-
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ernment funding of religion evident in Supreme Court case law, but it is
also evident among the Supreme Court justices.77 The Zelman decision
lieves in the "evenhanded treatment" of religious institutions under the law. See
Green, supra note 74, at 1114 (describing theory underlying neutrality). Some
cases used neutrality as a way of upholding government funding of faith-based ser-
vices. SeeWitters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986)
(holding that Washington may grant vocational training funds to disabled student
attending religious institution without violating Establishment Clause); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983) (holding that tax deduction for educational
expenses that primarily benefited parents of children attending sectarian schools
did not violate Establishment Clause); see also GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra, at
19 (discussing neutrality as rising Establishment Clause theory). In addition to
emphasizing religious neutrality, both the Mueller and Witters cases emphasized the
intervening role of beneficiary choice. See id. (stating emphasis on choice in these
cases). While this period did not dramatically change the law from the separation-
ist days, with respect to direct fundings, several significant cases were on the hori-
zon. See id. at 20 (stating that there was no change in approach for direct funding
cases but important cases were to come). In 1985, the Court held that public em-
ployees were not allowed to teach in parochial schools. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (holding that state program that funds instructors to teach in
underprivileged schools violated Constitution), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997). Then in 1997, the Court overruled Aguilar, holding that
public employees were allowed to teach remedial reading and arithmetic in relig-
ious schools. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that public school teachers
providing remedial education in private religious schools does not violate Consti-
tution). The question of "primary effect" was no longer the key question for the
Court in this case, but rather whether the state was responsible for religious indoc-
trination of students. See id. at 230 (noting that "placing full-time employees on
parochial school campuses does not as a matter of law have the impermissible
effect of advancing religion through indoctrination"). The Court refused to pre-
sume that public employees teaching secular subjects would be co-opted into par-
ticipation in religious education. See id. at 211-12, 224 (stating guidelines for
public employees teaching in parochial schools and no presumption that employ-
ees will inculcate religion in students). In 2000, the Supreme Court upheld a di-
rect aid program that loaned educational materials, including books, computers,
software and video players, to public and private schools, both religious and secu-
lar. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (holding that statute that al-
lows state funds to be allocated for educational equipment that will be loaned to
private schools does not violate the Establishment Clause). In upholding the fed-
eral-state cooperative program, Mitchell overruled several separationist era cases.
See GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra, at 23 (stating Mitchell's effect on previous
cases).
77. See Cole, supra note 12, at 562 (explaining views of current justices). Cole
states that:
Four justices-ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas-take a strict assimilationist view, approving of any aid to relig-
ion so long as it is administered in a formally neutral manner, while three
Justices-Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens-adopt a separationist stance,
viewing most direct government support of religious activity as unconsti-
tutional. Only Justices O'Connor and Breyer (and sometimes only
O'Connor) have staked out the middle ground, where government sup-
port to religion pursuant to a neutral law of general applicability is some-
times but not invariably permissible.
Id. His article, however, was written prior to the Zelman decision. In Zelman, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas upheld the
voucher program while Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.
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shifted this divide in the direction of the assimilationists because this deci-
sion "represents the most recent and dramatic move away from Separa-
tionism." 78 By a five-to-four vote, the Court declared that "'independent
choice' trumped 'no-aid separationism."' 79
Zelman, however, is just another part of the trend in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence away from separationism. In the last two decades of
the twentieth century, this trend has promoted:
[E]qual access for religious speech to public fora in which private
speech is welcome; expansion of aid possibilities, both direct and
indirect, so long as recipient institutions are defined in a relig-
ion-neutral way and the aid is given for a secular purpose; and an
accelerating concern that government not speak in a religious
voice.80
Thus, this trend has promoted religious pluralism, allowed religious insti-
tutions to play a more significant role in public programs and has pre-
vented the government from both discriminating against religious views or
having religious views of its own.8 1 This demise of separationism has
prompted much scholarship on its history.8 2
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 642 (2002) (noting decision of eachjudge and outcome of case).
78. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 919 (describing Zelman decision). The
Zelman decision allows relationships between government spending and services
offered by religious entities that were once thought to be forbidden. See id.
(describing effect of Zelman decision).
79. Id. at 926 (describing effect of Zelman decision).
80. GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 76, at 22 (discussing Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
81. See id. (stating benefits of trends).
82. See Green, supra note 74, at 1117 ("The impending demise of separation-
ism, and the concomitant ascension of neutrality, has been the subject of scholarly
examination for'several years."). Much of the scholarship recognizes that anti-Ca-
tholicism may have been the root of separationism. See GOVERNMENT PARTNER-
SHIPS, supra note 76, at 17 ("[A] number of scholars have argued that anti-Catholic
sentiment-hardly unheard of in the U.S. in its first century and one-half-
animated the [s]eparationist content reflected in the Everson opinions."); Sala-
manca, supra note 15, at 950-51 ("[M]ore than one responsible scholar has gently
chided the early and mid-separationist Court for handing down decisions that re-
flect anti-[C]atholic animus.... By the mid-1940s, fear of Roman Catholicism had
become common among the intellectual elite in the United States.").
Professor Clarke E. Cochran argues that the metaphor of a wall of separation
is misleading. See Clarke E. Cochran, Neutrality and Public Policy: Hidden Public Policy
Traps in Mitchell v. Helms, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS 225 (Stephen V.
Monsma ed., 2002). Cochran writes:
My own preference is for the metaphor of a "border." Borders are places
of separation. Honduras is not El Salvador; France is not Germany.
Church is not (and should not be) state. The purpose behind the meta-
phor of separation is sound; some interactions between the institutions of
religion and state harm both. Borders, however, do more than separate;
they control movement, trade, and interaction. Borders are porous to a
greater or lesser degree, which is half of their purpose. People and ideas
676 [Vol. 49: p. 661
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The Court's move away from separationism makes common and prac-
tical sense for the well-being of our society. One scholar states that
"[i]nstead of trying to place walls of separation between public and pri-
vate, and between church and state, only to breach or ignore them again
and again, it would be more appropriate to determine how to allocate
responsibilities in a world that mixes public and private."8 3 She continues
by stating that "[s]ome form of shared responsibility, connecting govern-
ments with private groups (both religious and nonreligious) seems both
most practical and most fitting."8 4 Government funding of faith-based ser-
vices is part of this practical solution to our country's responsibilities to the
less fortunate. Zelman and the judicial retreat from separationism seem to
logically pave the constitutional way for some forms of funding for faith-
based services.
and commerce must flow between nations if they are to remain healthy.
Similarly, the territory of religion and public life is a rich and fascinating
borderland. Both legitimate goods and contraband abound. Relation-
ships are fluid; checkpoints shift.
Id. at 226. This argument is far from what separationists believe. See Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable."). This, however,
may not be what the Framers truly intended when they wrote the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. See A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUB-
LIC LiwE 109 (1985) (explaining Madison's interpretation of First Amendment).
For instance, James Madison believed that "'Congress should not establish a relig-
ion, [ ] enforce the legal worship of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in
any manner contrary to their own beliefs.'" Id. In addition, Madison wanted to
insert the word "national" into the amendment before the word "religion" so that
it would be clear that only the establishment by the federal government was pro-
hibited. See id. (stating Madison's idea of adding "national" to amendment, but
antifederalists wanted no mention of word "national" in text). Actually, the com-
peting and differing theories regarding the Establishment Clause may be due to
the uncertainty regarding the Framers' intent. See Ashley M. Bell, Comment, "God
Save This Honorable Court" How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Rec-
onciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1273,
1281 n.40 (citing ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD FLOWERS, ToWARD BENEVOLENT
NEUTRALITY 241 (3d ed. 1987)).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that "separation of church and state" does
not appear in the First Amendment. See Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Wel-
fare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 512 (1999)
("Despite its common use, the phrase 'separation of church and state' neither ap-
pears in the First Amendment nor adequately summarizes the complex case law
implementing the ban against governmental establishment of religion and the
guarantee of religious free exercise."). It is also important to note that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, a strict constructionist, thinks that the original intention behind
the Establishment Clause was to forbid Congress from designating a "national
church" and from enacting laws favoring one religion over another. See Lewis D.
Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., Faith-Based Charities and the Quest to Solve
America's Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 265,
287 (2001) (stating Chief Justice Rehnquist's view on Establishment Clause).
83. Minow, supra note 82, at 508.
84. Id. at 509. Nevertheless, Minow states that "no practical and coherent
conception of social provision can proceed without facing the constraints imposed
by the United States Constitution and its interpretation by the courts." Id.
2004] NOTE 677
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B. The Zelman Decision in the Context of Faith-Based Services
The Zelman decision may create the only constitutionally acceptable
framework for President Bush's faith-based service initiatives to be realized
under the law.8 5 Although Zelman is based in the education context, its
approval of indirect funding of services provided to religious entities ex-
tends to other social services. 86 Neutrality and true private choice are the
measure of constitutionality, rather than the specific service in question. 87
Thus, with Zelman's focus on the choice of the beneficiary through a
voucher system, a similar voucher system applied to social service pro-
grams would be an appropriate method for government funding of faith-
based services.
88
Vouchers represent a form of the normally constitutional method of
indirect aid. 89 In Zelman, "the majority emphasized the traditional distinc-
tion between 'direct aid' and 'private choice' programs and stated that it
85. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 984 ("Given its approval of voucher
programs that transfer funds from government to private religious organizations,
Zelman represents the only constitutionally acceptable path for realizing the 'level
playing field' the President seeks.").
86. See id. at 982 (stating that Zelman's approval of indirect funding to relig-
ious providers "extends seamlessly to other social services").
87. See id. (noting that "[flormal neutrality and 'true private choice' remain
the measure of constitutionality"). Whether the program is schooling or welfare
services, the type of service should not be a determinative factor of constitutional-
ity. See Minow, supra note 82, at 556. (discussing challenge of connecting "public
and private lives" with respect to education). Martha Minow argues that "[t]he
injection of private religious options into the delivery of welfare services is perhaps
less worrisome because food and shelter, job training, and drug treatment do not
hold the place of civic and cultural meaning that schooling does." Id.
88. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 984 ("As applied to social service
programs, the voucher device would permit government to finance beneficiaries
who choose to obtain services at faith-based providers, so long as secular providers
were among the available choices.").
89. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (discussing Su-
preme Court jurisprudence of direct and indirect aid programs). The majority in
Zelman indicated that indirect aid programs have remained unequivocally
constitutional:
[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government
programs that provide aid directly to religious schools, and programs of
true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private indi-
viduals. While our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of
direct aid programs has "changed significantly" over the past two decades,
our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has re-
mained consistent and unbroken. Three times we have confronted Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide
aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to
religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we
have rejected such challenges.
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had consistently upheld those programs falling into the latter category." 90
Therefore, the voucher method, which in its definition is based on choice,
may be the best method for permitting faith-based services to receive gov-
ernment funding.9 1 Even prior to the Zelman decision, one commentator
wrote that the "intercession of private choice could well immunize such
expenditures from an Establishment Clause challenge." 92 Private choice
through vouchers immunizes government programs from an Establish-
ment Clause challenge because, arguably, the choice of whether the
money goes to a religious provider or a secular provider is being made by
the beneficiary and not by the public choice of the government.
93
Under true private choice programs, the religious nature does not
come under constitutional attack. Government funding of religious enti-
ties based on beneficiary choice does not prevent faith-based service prov-
iders from maintaining their religious character. 94  This facet of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is beneficial to faith-based services be-
cause much of their success is due to this religious character.9 5 Beyond
90. Tobias G. Fenton, Student Symposium, Religious Schools After Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris: The Need to Revive the Role of Legislative Purpose in Establishment
Clause Cases, 83 B.U. L. REV. 647, 667 (2003).
91. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 992 ("Zelman... suggests that vouch-
ers are indeed the path of least constitutional resistance for government partner-
ships with faith-intensive providers.").
92. Minow, supra note 82, at 534. Although Minow makes this statement with
respect to the early analysis of school vouchers, she elaborates on how the analysis
can correlate to a voucher system for social services. See id. at 534-35 (connecting
vouchers for schooling to vouchers for social services). Minow explains:
The child whose parents use a voucher to select a parochial school exer-
cises a private choice and does not thereby produce a governmental en-
dorsement of religion. Similarly, an individual recipient of a voucher for
temporary financial assistance who elects to redeem it at a local church
expresses a personal, not a governmental, choice. The individual could
then choose a program that includes, for example, prayer as part of the
contact with the participating nonpublic agency.
Id.
93. See Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 475,
485 (2002) ("If a federal or state government were to issue vouchers under the
indirect aid provision, it could argue that it is the private choice of the benefi-
ciaries, not the public choice of the government, that involves religious organiza-
tions in the government function.").
94. See GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 76, at 25 ("Most significantly,
the restriction on government support of specifically religious activities, such as
worship or religious instruction, does not operate in the universe of beneficiary
choice programs.").
95. For a discussion of the success of faith-based services due to their religious
character, see infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text. Charitable Choice legis-
lation acknowledged that the religious character of faith-based services was key to
its success. See White House Release, supra note 7, at Barriers to Faith-Based Orga-
nizations Seeking Federal Support (discussing impetus for Charitable Choice legis-
lation). According to the White House, prior to Charitable Choice:
[C] ommunity-serving religious groups seeking support often had to con-
ceal, and sometimes even compromise, their distinct religious charac-
ter-the very quality that sparked and sustained their success in
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allowing faith-based services to keep the faith in their services, the voucher
regime ensures that the government is not putting service recipients in
programs with a religious character; rather, the beneficiary is choosing
whether the beneficiary wants to be placed in a program of that nature.
96
Moreover, under federal law, when funding a faith-based social service, the
government must provide an alternative secular service provider when the
recipient objects to the religious character of the faith-based provider. 97
Thus, the government is not directly supporting a religious organization.
On the other hand, direct aid provides no "buffer" between the govern-
ment and the religious organization, thereby raising constitutional ques-
tions.9 8 Despite the constitutional murkiness of direct aid programs, faith-
based service providers and government administrators view them as more
economically advantageous than vouchers.99
mobilizing volunteers and achieving uncommon results. Charitable
Choice was written to respond point-by-point to various inappropriate re-
strictions by explicitly protecting religious charities from pressures to sec-
ularize their programs, abandon their religious character, or sacrifice
their autonomy.
Id. Charitable Choice evenhandedly responded to these problems by allowing re-
ligious organizations to receive government grants for social services "without im-
pairing the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the
religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program." 42
U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2003) (emphasis added).
96. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) ("The incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the govern-
ment, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.").
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e) (1) (describing rights of beneficiaries). The Code
states:
If an individual . . . has an objection to the religious character of the
organization or institution from which the individual receives, or would
receive, assistance funded under any program .. . the State in which the
individual resides shall provide such individual (if otherwise eligible for
such assistance) within a reasonable period of time after the date of such
objection with assistance from an alternative provider that is accessible to
the individual and the value of which is not less than the value of the
assistance which the individual would have received from such
organization.
Id.
98. See Michelman, supra note 93, at 485 ("Direct aid, by contrast, provides no
buffer between the government and the religious organizations to which it dele-
gates the social service function.").
99. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 993 (stating that vouchers are not as
economically sound as direct aid nor are they as effective at inducing faith-based
organizations into performing services). Government administrators who want to
induce new providers through Charitable Choice believe that vouchers do not
have the "quick and large payoff' that government agencies want. See id. (discuss-
ing government administrators' concerns regarding vouchers). Essentially, these
administrators understand that "vouchers may be constitutionally secure," how-
ever, they also view them as "economically unpromising." Id. (explaining perplex-
ing situation of government administrators who understand that vouchers, unlike
direct aid programs, are constitutionally sound but are not as economically sound
as direct aid).
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Zelman does not necessarily answer the question whether its premise
encompasses direct aid programs. 10 0 Because the Zelman majority put a
large emphasis on the Ohio school voucher program being an indirect aid
program of true private choice, it could be inferred that if the program
was one of direct aid or the choice was restricted to only religious schools,
the Court would have more closely followed Establishment Clause prece-
dent and would have struck down the program.10 1 Nevertheless, Zelman
does not rule out direct aid programs as being potentially
constitutional. 102
A direct aid program that involves funding to a wide range of service
providers, both religious and secular, and allows the intended beneficiary
to choose which provider to seek help from, may encompass many of the
same principles used to uphold the Ohio school voucher program. Such a
direct aid program may be considered constitutional and may actually fall
within the category of indirect aid.1 03
Thus, even if the government directly funds a religious entity, the pro-
gram would be considered constitutional as long as the beneficiary has
true private choice. For example, in Freedom from Religion Foundation v.
McCallum, the Wisconsin Department of Correction entered a contract
with Faith Works, a faith-based residential treatment center for substance
abuse, to provide services for eligible offenders within the state's correc-
tional system. 10 4 The Department also had contracts with non-faith-based
halfway houses; however, those programs were only thirty to ninety days
long, whereas the Faith Works program was nine to twelve months long. 10 5
100. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Public Values in an Era of Privatization: The New
Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1397, 1420 (2003) (questioning
whether direct government funding of religious service providers is constitutional
if "government's funding criteria neutrally includes both religious and nonreli-
gious recipients").
101. See SaraJ. Crisafulli, Comment, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Is the Supreme
Court's Last Word on School Voucher Programs Really the Last Word?, 71 FoRDHAm L.
REv. 2227, 2270 (2003) ("[T]he Court focused on the indirect nature of the aid-
that it was first sent to parents who then endorsed the check over to the school-to
circumvent the need to look further at the Lemon criteria. Had the funds been
sent directly from the State to the sectarian schools, or had the voucher program
restricted participation to private religious schools, the Court would likely have
followed its Establishment Clause precedent more closely.").
102. For a further discussion of the potential constitutionality of direct aid
programs, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. For a further discussion of the effect of private choice on the classifica-
tion of a program as an indirect aid program, see infra notes 104-13, and accompa-
nying text.
104. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d
905, 908 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (explaining contract with Faith Works); Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960-61 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
105. See McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 909 ("In addition to Faith Works, the
Division of Community Corrections also contracts with the following non-faith-
based halfway houses in the Milwaukee area: Horizon House, Independent Living
Center, Interventions, Joshua Glover Halfway House, Thurgood Marshall House
and The Bridge Halfway House. The programs these facilities offer are generally
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Probation and parole agents referred the offenders to Faith Works.' 0 6 Be-
cause the Faith Works program included a religious component, the
agents had to inform the offenders about its religious nature and that they
did not have to participate if they did not want to.
10 7
Using Zelman, the district court upheld the contract with Faith Works
because the offenders who benefited from the program had an indepen-
dent, private choice. 10 8 The district court was able to use Zelman despite
Faith Works receiving a contract and direct funding from Wisconsin be-
cause the court deemed it indirect aid "because the program does not
receive payments of a set amount from the department but instead re-
ceives funding based on the number of offenders enrolled in the pro-
gram." 10 9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this
decision."l 0 When discussing how Zelman created the constitutional basis
for upholding Wisconsin's funding of Faith Works, Judge Richard Posner
likened the case to Zelman:
The practice challenged in the present case is similar [to Ohio's
school voucher plan in Zelman]. The state in effect gives eligible
offenders "vouchers" that they can use to purchase a place in a
halfway house, whether the halfway house is "parochial" or secu-
lar. We have put "vouchers" in scare quotes because the state has
dispensed with the intermediate step by which the recipient of
the publicly funded private service hands his voucher to the ser-
vice provider. But so far as the policy of the establishment clause is
concerned, there is no difference between giving the voucher re-
cipient a piece of paper that directs the public agency to pay the
30-90 days in length, whereas the Faith Works program provides nine to twelve
months of residential treatment.").
106. See id. at 910 ("Not all offenders were eligible to enroll in Faith Works
under the Non-traditional Opportunities for Work program, which requires that
the individual have dependent children. Eligible Department of Corrections of-
fenders who participated in Faith Works were referred to the program by proba-
tion and parole agents. Offenders are not given carte blanche to choose whatever
program they desire or a sum certain that they can use for whatever treatment
services they select.").
107. See id. at 910 (stating that Department of Corrections agents were in-
structed repeatedly to tell offenders that Faith Works has religious component and
offenders do not have to participate). While none of the offenders referred to
Faith Works objected and there was no directive to offer a secular alternative, Su-
san Wundrow, a parole and probation agent, testified that if an offender objected,
she would have talked to her supervisor about placing the offender in a non-faith-
based halfway house. See id. (stating that offenders would not necessarily be of-
fered secular alternative to Faith Works, although offender would be asked
whether offender objected to referral).
108. See id. at 920 ("I find that offenders participate in the program as a result
of their genuinely, independent, private choice.").
109. Id. at 914.
110. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 884
(7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that it is misunderstanding to suppose that choice is
not free when choices are not equally attractive to chooser).
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service provider and the agency's asking the recipient to indicate
his preference and paying the provider whose service he
prefers."1
Government funding based on vouchers is thus more likely to be a pro-
gram based on true private choice. Therefore, Zelman, as applied in the
McCallum cases, truly makes vouchers "the path of least constitutional re-
sistance for government partnerships with faith-intensive providers." 112
McCallum shows that direct funding through grants or contracts may
actually not fall within the constitutional murkiness of direct aid pro-
grams. If the program involves beneficiary choice, it is essentially a
voucher system. 1 13 The only difference is that the government money
does not go to the beneficiary first. The beneficiary simply instructs the
government where to send it. To say that there is a major constitutional
difference between these two different ways to use vouchers is to create a
technicality for the sole purpose of thwarting the government's attempt to
fund faith-based services and thus preventing help for those in dire need
of these services. Irrespective of how the money is channeled from the
government to the faith-based service, the constitutionality of the program
depends on the availability of choice for the program's beneficiaries.
C. Concerns About Choice
For programs to be based on "choice," there must be a variety of relig-
ious and secular providers for the beneficiary to choose from, and the
choice must be "real" so that beneficiaries are not pressured into a relig-
ious setting as an unwanted consequence of their need for public assis-
tance. 114 Thus, one of the major criticisms of voucher programs is that
the requisite availability and freedom of choice are not met.1 15 In Zelman,
Justice Souter in dissent attacked the legitimacy of the choice available in
Ohio's school voucher program. 11 6 He stated that the majority was "con-
fusing" the question of choice by including all alternative educational op-
tions such as community or magnet schools into its analysis.1 17 Also, since
111. Id. at 882.
112. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 992.
113. See McCallum, 324 F.3d at 882 (explaining that process of funding Faith
Works including beneficiary choice is essentially voucher system).
114. See Stephen Macedo, Religion and Civic Education Constituting Civil Society:
School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 417, 446 (2000) (discussing means necessary to have real choice).
115. See Minow, supra note 82, at 535 (stating that individual choice requires
both sufficient autonomy to choose and sufficient options for choice to be
meaningful).
116. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 695-96 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that majority's standards of neutrality and free choice do not
legitimize Ohio's plan).
117. See id. at 698-99 (explaining majority's misapplication of choice require-
ment). Justice Souter explains his problem with the majority's construction of the
choice requirement by stating:
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there was a tuition cap, he was concerned that choice was being negatively
effected by the fact that Catholic schools cost less than secular private
schools.1 18 Private schools would have to subsidize more of the cost above
the cap than the Catholic schools, thus discouraging private schools from
participating in the program. 119 In turn, this limits the number of non-
religious schools from which a parent can choose. 120 Therefore, Justice
Souter's view on whether there was true private choice was much different
from the majority's view. 12 1
Despite Establishment Clause jurisprudence moving away from
separationism, the government should still be ready to fight over whether
a program funding a religious entity actually gives the beneficiaries a true
private choice. 12 2 Some may argue that true private choice exists only
The majority's view that all educational choices are comparable for pur-
poses of choice thus ignores the whole point of the choice test: it is a
criterion for deciding whether indirect aid to a religious school is legiti-
mate because it passes through private hands that can spend or use the
aid in a secular school. The question is whether the private hand is genu-
inely free to send the money in either a secular direction or a religious
one. The majority now has transformed this question about private
choice in channeling aid into a question about selecting from examples
of state spending (on education) including direct spending on magnet
and community public schools that goes through no private hands and
could never reach a religious school under any circumstance. When the
choice test is transformed from where to spend the money to where to go
to school, it is cut loose from its very purpose.
Id. at 699.
118. See id. at 704-05 ("[T]he $2,500 cap that the program places on tuition
for participating low-income pupils has the effect of curtailing the participation of
nonreligious schools: 'nonreligious schools with higher tuition (about $4,000)
stated that they could afford to accommodate just a few voucher students.' By
comparison, the average tuition at participating Catholic schools in Cleveland in
1999-2000 was $1,592, almost $1,000 below the cap.").
119. See Sullivan, supra note 100, at 1416 n.64 (explaining thatJustice Souter's
conclusion that there is no "genuinely free choice" derives from voucher monetary
amount covering parish-subsidized Catholic school tuition, but voucher amount
does not cover tuition for most private schools).
120. See Fenton, supra note 90, at 668 ("Although participants in the Cleve-
land program decide which schools receive their aid, the majority failed to resolve
the situation presented here, where the initial pool from which those participants
can choose is arguably limited by the program's tuition cap.").
121. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 707 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing divergence
of views between majority and dissent). Justice Souter stated that "there is, in any
case, no way to interpret the 96.6% of current voucher money going to religious
schools as reflecting a free and genuine choice by the families that apply for vouch-
ers. The 96.6% reflects, instead, the fact that too few nonreligious school desks are
available and few but religious schools can afford to accept more than a handful of
voucher students." Id. On the other hand, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for the major-
ity, stated that, with respect to choice, "[t]he constitutionality of a neutral educa-
tional aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area,
at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school." Id. at 658.
122. See Minow, supra note 82, at 535 (discussing concerns about choice being
genuine). Martha Minow gives an example of how choice can be attacked under a
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government funded faith-based service because of the beneficiary's ability or lack
of ability to make a choice due to duress or condition. See id. (expressing concern
for beneficiary potentially not having true autonomy to choose). She states that:
The sheer fact that the arena involves subsistence (as well as day care,
substance abuse treatment, and other services crucial to daily survival)
renders questionable the assertion that recipients are freely and autono-
mously choosing. Autonomous choice is in jeopardy when the individual
has no money, food, or housing and is offered these necessities on condi-
tions that she might quickly refuse under other circumstances. Consider
a single mother who left home with her two preschool children out of
fear of domestic violence. Upon arriving at the local church that has the
city contract for providing temporary assistance, she may be too afraid to
object to the religious character of the services. "Choosing" a religious
provider under these circumstances may reflect the kind of duress that
calls into question the volition involved. Rather than an individual choos-
ing, we would have a government manipulating and burdening the
choice of the individual. Especially if the alternative is farther away, less
visible, or less convenient, a voucher recipient may end up with a perva-
sively religious provider of a particular denomination, despite a desire to
receive help elsewhere. Faced with the power of a caseworker to deny
eligibility for the voucher in the first place, a destitute and desperate per-
son may be quite reluctant to voice concerns about the location and iden-
tity of the service provider.
Id.
The objections to faith-based services are not just limited to the issue of
choice. For example, the libertarian think-tank, the Cato Institution, published a
report on how government funding will corrupt faith-based charities. See generally
Michael Tanner, Corrupting Charity: Why Government Should Not Fund Faith-Based
Charities, CATO Institute Briefing Papers (Mar. 22, 2001), at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/briefs/bp62.pdf. Because of regulations required by government funding,
"[c]harities attempting to meet all the grant conditions can find themselves com-
pletely redesigning their programs. As a result, programs that were once very suc-
cessful can become unrecognizable." Id. at 10. Essentially, Tanner is concerned
that mixing government with charity could undermine the reasons why faith-based
services are effective in the first place. See id. at I (stating that government funding
of faith-based services contains risks that might hinder effectiveness). His argu-
ment, however, does not recognize that Charitable Choice and Bush's Faith-Based
Initiatives are trying to get faith-based services government funding without them
sacrificing their religious character. See generally White House Release, supra note
7, at Barriers to Faith-Based Organizations Seeking Federal Support (discussing
barriers to federal support of faith-based services). Moreover, a survey of govern-
ment funded faith-based programs in fifteen states found that: (1) 93% of the
faith-based services stated that their experience with the government was "very" or
"somewhat" positive, and 92% said they would contract with the government again;
(2) less than 6% agreed with the common fear expressed above that public money
would compromise their religiosity, displace private funds or limit their ability to
be critical of the government; and (3) the most common complaint was the "bur-
densomeness of government reporting requirements" with 29% of service provid-
ers calling them a "considerable" or a "great" burden. SeeJohn C. Green & Amy L.
Sherman, Fruitful Collaborations: A Survey of Government-Funded Faith-Based Programs
in 15 States, 4-5 (Hudson Inst., 2002), available at http://www.hudsonfaithincom-
munities.org/articles/fruitful collab.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (listing find-
ings of survey).
Another concern is with privatization (which includes Bush's faith-based ini-
tiatives) in general because it can lead to less control and review of these groups.
See Minow, supra note 4, at 1235 (explaining criticism of privatization). "Privatiza-
tion can undermine a value as basic as guarding against the misuse of public
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when there is a level playing field of all options, both secular and religious,
and the religious and secular choices are of the same quality and price.
1 23
Judge Posner in McCallum gave the best argument against this construc-
tion of the meaning of true private choice, stating that it would be "a mis-
understanding of freedom.., to suppose that choice is not free when the
objects between which the chooser must choose are not equally attractive
to him." 124 Using a simplistic example, Judge Posner proposed that if you
could only choose between chocolate and vanilla ice cream and you said
vanilla because it was "the only honest answer" you could give, it cannot be
said that you did not exercise free will or you "had no choice" when you
chose vanilla.
125
D. The Effectiveness of Faith
Faith-based services provide valuable social services in poverty-stricken
areas of our country, and the services' religious values facilitate their effec-
funds." Id. at 1247. If there is no regulation, these groups can avoid otherwise
applicable obligations and reporting requirements to the public. See id. (explain-
ing how lack of regulation may lead to lack of accountability to public). The ob-
ject, however, of Charitable Choice and Bush's faith-based service initiatives is not
to get rid of all regulation, but just the regulation that unnecessarily impedes the
services' religious quality. See White House Release, supra note 7, at Barriers to
Faith-Based Organizations Seeking Federal Support (discussing burdensome re-
strictions on faith-based services to receive government funding). This lessening
of restrictions is not taking away from core requirements of accountability, but
rather from ridiculous requirements placed on faith-based services to try and ac-
quire funding. An example of the overburdensome demands of government on
faith-based services is that the "U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment wrote to the Catholic archbishop of Los Angeles concerning federal aid re-
ceived by his St. Vincent de Paul Shelter for the homeless. HUD asked whether it
would be possible to rename it the 'Mr. Vincent de Paul Shelter.'" George F. Will,
Keeping Faith Behind Initiatives, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 2001, at B7; see also Tanner,
supra, at 3 (commenting how in this incident federal government was "almost
comic in [its] extremism").
123. The plaintiffs in McCallum tried to argue that because Faith Works pro-
vided a longer and better quality treatment program, the offenders did not have a
real choice. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880,
883-84 (7th Cir. 2003). Their argument was that the offenders had to choose Faith
Works because their other choices were inferior and thus not real choices. See id.
at 884 (stating that plaintiffs tried to argue that offenders had no real choice). In
response to this argument, Judge Posner said that "quality cannot be coercion."
Id. He stated that Faith Works would essentially be penalized because its secular
competitors cannot or will not invest as much as Faith Works does into providing a
quality service. See id. (noting negative effect on Faith Works for being effective
and quality program). This would have the perverse incentive of having programs
reduce quality to get government funding, thus creating "a race to the bottom."
Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. ("It would mean that a person was not exercising his free will
when in response to the question whether he preferred vanilla or chocolate ice
cream he said vanilla, because it was the only honest answer that he could have
given and therefore 'he had no choice.'").
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tiveness. 126 While there is no "smoking gun" proof that faith-based ser-
vices are more effective than government social services, there is proof of
their effectiveness in general, and there is no proof that they are less effec-
tive. 12 7 Additionally, many faith-based services provide services such as
love and companionship that are hard to quantitatively measure in terms
of success.1 28 Despite faith-based services being in "constitutionally un-
marked territory," the country has an obligation to do what is best for
social policy.129 Thus, broadening the range of providers and increasing
126. See Cole, supra note 12, at 567 (arguing that religious institutions are
often situated in, and provide social services to, poverty-stricken areas). Criminolo-
gists who analyze the ability of community-based organizations have found that
organizations based in the community are more effective than outside organiza-
tions in reducing criminal behavior. See id. (noting conclusion of criminologists).
Organizations "that reinforce community ties are especially effective" in the fight
against crime. Id. at 568. These community groups need not be religious to be
effective; however, religious groups are the primary provider of services in many
inner city neighborhoods. See id. (stating that religious entities are sometimes only
viable source in inner cities). Cole further showed how the religious values that
are at the heart of faith services contribute to the effectiveness in poverty-stricken
communities. See id. at 569 (arguing that religious values and commitments con-
tribute to effective provision of social services). Religious communities, at their
core, are deeply committed to respecting all human beings and believing that all
humans deserve forgiveness and redemption. See id. (describing religion's com-
mitment to humankind). While none of these moral beliefs are exclusively relig-
ious, moral teaching is more "comfortably situated" in the religious sphere than in
the government or secular sphere. See id. (stating that these commitments and
morals in general have place in secular society, but are better suited in religion).
Cole concludes that "[g]overnment support of faith-based institutions offers the
possibility of reinforcing these values through society." Id.
127. See id. at 576 ("Although no empirical research proves that faith-based
programs are better than secular programs, certainly none prove that they are
worse."). The Bush Administration believes that private administration of social
programs in general, both religious and secular, is inherently superior to govern-
ment administration. See Diller, supra note 10, at 1757 (stating Bush Administra-
tion's opinion). Also, critics of the effectiveness of faith-based services or those
who desire to leave the job of social welfare to the government bureaucracy,
should recognize that "the Federal Government routinely awards billions in tax-
payer support to organizations whose own efficiency and cost-effectiveness have
not been validated by careful studies." White House Release, supra note 7, at Barri-
ers: A Federal System Inhospitable to Faith-Based and Community Organizations.
The Bush Administration has emphasized that there is a need for studying the
effectiveness of all programs the government funds. See id. (indicating across-the-
board emphasis on efficiency of government funded programs).
128. See Robert Wuthnow et al., The Effectiveness and Trustworthiness of Faith-
Based and Other Service Organizations: A Study of Recipients' Perceptions, at http://
www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/events/2003-spring-research conference/
wuthnow.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003) (stating leading argument of nonprofit
organizations is that services they provided cannot be easily or economically
measured).
129. See Sullivan, supra note 100, at 1420 (agreeing with Martha Minow's ad-
vice that government funding of faith-based services is approached "with a practi-
cal eye on the best social policy").
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their funding provides nothing but beneficial aspects to children in poor
schools, drug addicted persons and the working poor.
130
Studies show evidence of faith-based services' success. For example, a
Princeton University study showed that recipients of faith-based services
view them as effective and trustworthy; however, the study showed little
support for the proposition that faith-based services are more effective
than secular service providers.13 1 With respect to prison rehabilitation, a
study of New York prisons showed that prisoners who participated in the
Prison Fellowship Bible studies program and took part in only ten classes
had a much lower rate of recidivism.1 3 2 Only fourteen percent of the par-
ticipants "were rearrested within a year of their release, while among the
matched group of those who had not taken part, forty-one percent were
rearrested."' 33 The Prison Fellowship program is also in Texas, and of the
eighty prisoners who participated so far, only five percent have returned to
prison.' 3 4 With respect to substance abuse rehabilitation, a Christian drug
treatment center called Teen Challenge was found to be "much more ef-
fective than its secular counterpart."1 5 Teen Challenge had a ninety-five
percent success rate with heroin addicts and an eighty-three percent suc-
cess rate with alcoholics-numbers that are far higher than secular drug
rehabilitation programs. 13 6 Alcoholics Anonymous is a well-known exam-
ple of a treatment program that incorporates faith into its process, al-
though it is nondenominational. 13 7 With respect to crime, a 1995 review
130. See id. ("From the point of view of children facing limited educational
options and adults in dire need, broadening the array of educators and health and
welfare providers to include religious organizations, subject to public conditions,
had much to recommend it.").
131. See Wuthnow et al., supra note 128 ("[M]ean effectiveness and trustwor-
thiness scores are relatively high for FBOs .... On the other hand, there is little
support in these results for the hypothesis that FBOs may be more effective than
NSOs, at least not in terms of how they are perceived by recipients.").
132. See Stephen V. Monsma, Are Faith-Based Programs More Effective?, Public
Justice Report, Second Quarter 2001, at http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/
storyReader$545 (explaining study and its results).
133. Id.
134. See id. (discussing success of similar prison bible program in Texas).
135. Id.
136. See Cole, supra note 12, at 574-75 (highlighting statistics for Teen Chal-
lenge's success and how they are higher than secular programs).
137. See id. at 572 ("Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, a particularly suc-
cessful faith-based treatment program, is emphatically independent, radically de-
centralized, religious (although nondenominational), and committed to
community."). Cole further explains how the twelve-step program requires its par-
ticipants to look toward a "higher power" to cure their alcoholism. See id. (explain-
ing religious power behind twelve-step program). Unlike secular groups, this
commitment to a higher power creates an important bond among the participants,
which encourages their cure. See id. (stating how seeking higher power makes pro-
gram different than secular groups). Cole does note that half of the initial at-
tendees of Alcoholics Anonymous drop out after two months and 90% leave within
a year. See id. at 575 (discussing negative statistics on Alcoholics Anonymous). He
also cites an eight-year study by the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol
688
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of criminology literature determined that "religious influences discourage
crime and delinquency."13 8 A 2001 study found that religious involvement
reduced the number of youth-committed serious crimes in high crime ar-
eas. 139 A more specific example of the effectiveness of faith is the Ten
Point Coalition in Boston. 140 This group of clergy played an essential role
in helping decrease Boston's homicide rate eighty percent from 1990 to
1999.141 Therefore, there is some quantitative evidence of the success of
faith-based services.
The reason for much of this success can be equated to the religious
nature and values of the programs. One scholar argues that "[t]he con-
cepts of forgiveness, mercy and redemption are at the core of many
faiths." 142 This element of compassion in faith-based services is missing
from the bureaucratic lethargy of government services. 143 Supporters of
Abuse that found no discernible difference in the Alcoholics Anonymous program
and secular alternatives. See id. at 575-76 (noting findings of study on Alcoholics
Anonymous in comparison to secular programs).
138. T. David Evans, Francis T. Cullen, R. Gregory Dunaway & Velmer S. Bur-
ton, Jr., Religion and Crime Reexamined: The Impact of Religion, Secular Controls, and
Social Ecology on Adult Criminality, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 208-09 (1995).
139. See generally Byron R. Johnson, The Role of African-American Churches in
Reducing Crime Among Black Youths, at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/
crrucs2001_2.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003). Johnson described the results:
(1) the effects of neighborhood disorder on crime among black youth
are partly mediated by an individual's religious involvement; and (2) in-
volvement of African-American youth in religious institutions significantly
buffers or interacts with the effects of neighborhood disorder on crime,
and in particular, serious crime.
Id. While Johnson indicates that "much more research" is needed, his study dem-
onstrates that African-American churches "should no longer be overlooked or
[considered] 'invisible institutions' among criminologists." Id.
140. See Cole, supra note 12, at 568 (illustrating Ten Point Coalition's story
and success in Boston's fight against crime). After a shootout and stabbing during
a funeral service in 1992, members of the African-American clergy formed this
group. See id. (describing brutal violence at funeral and how it sparked foundation
of Ten Point Coalition). Despite being critics of some police tactics, the clergy
began working with the police to thwart gang violence by engaging in street minis-
try and reaching out to troubled youths. See id. (listing ways Ten Point Coalition
helped effort to subdue gang violence). The group also helped the police identify
the youths who were most responsible for the problems and advocated for harsh
punishments in some circumstances and leniency in others. See id. (explaining
how clergy helped Boston police). From David Cole's description, one can see the
tremendous effort exuded by these clergymen.
141. See id. ("Boston's homicide rate plummeted, falling 80% from 1990 to
1999, and the police and scholars have both acknowledged the critical role of the
Ten Point Coalition in that success story.").
142. Id. at 570.
143. See Minow, supra note 82, at 530-31 ("[T]he provision of care for the
most vulnerable should not be passed through the cold bureaucratic indifference
of state-sponsored programs, but instead by means of face-to-face exchanges with a
moral community. Ideally, the provision of care by religious groups adds moral
dimensions of expected responsibility and hope, and it facilitates relationships
within which people can feel the pressure to change."). John Dilulio (former head
of Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives) believes that, with respect to children in need of
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faith-based services and opponents of government social services argue
that the government causes dependency, while the working of faith can
help move people away from dependency, whether it be financial, drug or
another form of dependency.1 44 Also, because faith-based services are
connected to a faith, their employees may view their job as a mission
rather than simply a means of getting a paycheck.1 4 5 Therefore, aside
from the constitutional debates discussed in the previous sections, there
are statistics and solid arguments for the effectiveness of faith. 1 46
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Zelman's approval of school vouchers where there is
true private choice creates a constitutional framework for government
funding of faith-based services. 1 47 With a voucher system for faith-based
services, the beneficiary would choose from an array of secular and relig-
ious providers and the government would not be directly choosing a relig-
ious provider. President Bush's faith-based service initiatives can be
achieved through the constitutional framework of vouchers and benefici-
ary choice. Regardless of one's faith or party affiliation, all Americans
should desire the success of this program. With poverty and other social
ills still plaguing our country, new and effective governmental means to
end these struggles must be adopted.1 48 As Michael Harrington stated in
The Other America, his famous book about poverty in the United States,
"[t]he means are at hand to fulfill the age-old dream: poverty can now be
social services, they "do not so much need services but instead caring adults in
their lives." Id. at 531.
144. See id. (presenting argument that government fails to move people off
dependency while religious organizations provide care, attention and model of
independence).
145. See Cole, supra note 12, at 571 ("[T]he notion that work for others is a
central part of one's religious identity may contribute to the spirit in which the
work is done; employees of religious entities may be less likely than employees of
secular organizations and government agencies to treat their work as just a job.");
Minow, supra note 4, at 1239 ("The staff and volunteers are often acting out of
religious conviction and pursuing practices guided by religious teachings.").
146. See generally Cole, supra note 12, at 566-78 (explaining case for support-
ing faith-based services). Also, it must be noted that there is no evidence that faith-
based programs perform worse than the government and other secular programs,
and there are many anecdotal success stories of those who believe the power of
faith helped their desperate condition. See id. at 576 ("Although no empirical re-
search proves that faith-based programs are better than secular programs, certainly
none proves that they are worse. And it is difficult to dismiss the many testimonials
of those who believe they have been helped through religious intervention.").
147. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 984 (stating Zelman is constitutional
path for funding of faith-based services).
148. Poverty rose and income levels declined in 2002 for the second straight
year. See Lynette Clemetson, More Americans in Poverty in 2002, Census Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al (stating results from census study). The official
poverty rate is 12.1% and the total number of people living below the poverty line
is 34.6 million. See id. (noting exact numbers concerning poverty rate and percent-
age of people living in poverty).
[Vol. 49: p. 661
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abolished."1 49 Government funding of the great works of faith-based ser-
vices is one of those new and effective means to fulfill this dream.
Craig A. Newell, Jr.
149. MICHEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 174 (Touchstone 1997)
(1962).
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